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ABSTRACT
During the first step of practical reasoning, i.e. deliberation or goals selection, an intelligent agent
generates a set of pursuable goals and then selects which of them he commits to achieve. Explainable
Artificial Intelligence (XAI) systems, including intelligent agents, must be able to explain their
internal decisions. In the context of goals selection, agents should be able to explain the reasoning
path that leads them to select (or not) a certain goal. In this article, we use an argumentation-based
approach for generating explanations about that reasoning path. Besides, we aim to enrich the
explanations with information about emerging conflicts during the selection process and how such
conflicts were resolved. We propose two types of explanations: the partial one and the complete
one and a set of explanatory schemes to generate pseudo-natural explanations. Finally, we apply our
proposal to the cleaner world scenario.
Keywords Goal selection · Explainable agents · Formal argumentation
1 Introduction
Practical reasoning means reasoning directed towards actions, i.e. it is the process of figuring out what to do. According
to Wooldridge [1], practical reasoning involves two phases: (i) deliberation, which is concerned with deciding what state
of affairs an agent wants to achieve, thus, the outputs of deliberation phase are goals the agent intends to pursue, and (ii)
means-ends reasoning, which is concerned with deciding how to achieve these states of affairs. The first phase is also
decomposed in two parts: (i) firstly, the agent generates a set of pursuable goals1, and (ii) secondly, the agent chooses
which goals he will be committed to bring about. In this paper, we focus on the first phase, that is, goals selection.
Given that an intelligent agent may generate multiple pursuable goals, some conflicts among these goals could arise, in
the sense that it is not possible to pursue them simultaneously. Thus, a rational agent selects a set of non-conflicting
goals based in a criterion or a set of criteria. There are many researches about identifying and resolving such conflict in
order to determine the set of pursued goals (e.g., [3][4][5][6][7]). However, to the best of our knowledge, none of these
1Pursuable goals are also known as desires and pursued goals as intentions. In this work, we consider that both are goals at
different stages of processing, like it was suggested in [2].
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approaches gives explanations about the reasoning path to determine the final set of pursued goals. Thus, the returned
outcomes can be negatively affected due to the lack of clarity and explainability about their dynamics and rationality.
In order to better understand the problem, consider the well-know “cleaner world” scenario, where a set of robots
(intelligent agents) has the task of cleaning a dirty environment. The main goal of all the robots is to have the
environment clean. Besides cleaning, the robots have other goals such as recharging their batteries or being fixed.
Suppose that at a given moment one of the robots (let us call him BOB) detects dirt in slot (5,5); hence, the goal “cleaning
(5,5)” becomes pursuable. On the other hand, BOB also auto-detects a technical defect; hence, the goal “be fixed” also
becomes pursuable. Suppose that BOB cannot commit to both goals at the same time because the plans adopted for each
goal lead to an inconsistency. This means that only one of the goals will become pursued. Suppose that he decides to
fix its technical defect instead of cleaning the perceived dirt. During the cleaning task or after the work is finished, the
robot can be asked for an explanation about his decision. It is clear that it is important to endow the agents with the
ability of explaining their decisions, that is, to explain how and why a certain pursuable goal became (or not) a pursued
goal.
Thus, the research questions that are addressed in this paper are: (i) how to endow intelligent agents with the ability of
generating explanations about their goals selection process? and (ii) how to improve the informational quality of the
explanations?
In addressing the first question, we will use arguments to generate and represent the explanations. At this point, it
is important to mention that in this article, argumentation is used in two different ways. Firstly, argumentation will
be used in the goals selection process. The input to this process is a set of possible conflicting pursuable goals such
that each one has a preference value and a set of plans that allow the agent to achieve them, and the output is a set of
pursued goals. We will base on the work of Morveli-Espinoza et al. [4] for this process. One important contribution
given in [4] is the computational formalization of three forms of conflicts, namely terminal incompatibility, resource
incompatibility, and superfluity, which were conceptually defined in [2]. The identification of conflicts is done by using
plans, which are represented by instrumental arguments2. These arguments are compared in order to determine the form
of conflict that may exist between them. The set of instrumental arguments and the conflict relation between them make
up an Argumentation Framework (AF). Finally, in order to resolve the conflicts, an argumentation semantics is applied.
This semantics is a function that takes as input an AF and returns those non-conflicting goals the agent will commit to.
Secondly, argumentation is used in the process of explanation generation. The input to this process is the AF mentioned
above and the set of pursued goals and the output is a set of arguments that represent explanations. The arguments
constructed in this part are not instrumental ones, that is, they do not represent plan but explanations. Regarding the
second question, we will use the information in instrumental arguments for enriching explanations about the form(s) of
conflict that exists between two goals.
Next section focuses on the knowledge representation and the argumentation process for goal selection. Section 3
presents the argumentation process for generating explanations. Section 4 is devoted to the application of the proposal
to the cleaner world scenario. Section 5 presents the main related work. Finally, Section 6 is devoted to conclusions and
future work.
2 Argumentation Process for Goals Selection
In this section, we will present part of the results of the article of Morveli-Espinoza et al. [4], on which we will base to
construct the explanations. Since we want to enrich the explanations, we will increase the informational capacity of
some of the results.
Firstly, let L be a first-order logical language used to represent the mental states of the agent, ` denotes classical
inference, and ≡ the logical equivalence. Let G be the set of pursuable goals, which are represented by ground atoms
of L and B be the set of beliefs of the agent, which are represented by ground literals3 of L. In order to construct
instrumental arguments, other mental states are necessary (e.g. resources, actions, plan rules); however, they are not
meaningful in this article. Therefore, we will assume that the knowledge base (denoted by K) of an agent includes such
mental states, besides his beliefs.
According to Castelfranchi and Paglieri [2], three forms of incompatibility could emerge during the goals selection:
terminal, due to resources, and superfluity4. Morveli-Espinoza et al. [4] tackled the problems of identifying and
2An instrumental argument is structured like a tree where the nodes are planning rules whose premise is made of a set of sub-goals,
resources, actions, and beliefs and its conclusion or claim is a goal, which is the goal achieved by executing the plan represented by
the instrumental argument.
3Literals are atoms or negation of atoms (the negation of an atom a is denoted ¬a).
4Hereafter, terminal incompatibility is denoted by t, resource incompatibility by r, and superfluity by s.
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resolving these three forms of incompatibilities. In order to identify these incompatibilities the plans that allow to
achieve the goals in G are evaluated. Considering that in their proposal each plan is represented by means of instrumental
arguments, as a result of the identification problem, they defined three AFs (one for each form of incompatibility) and a
general AF that involves all of the instrumental arguments and attacks of the three forms of incompatibility.
Definition 1 (Argumentation frameworks) Let ARGins be the set of instrumental arguments that an agent can build
from K5. A x-AF is a pair AFx = 〈ARGx,Rx〉 (for x ∈ {t, r, s}) where ARGx ⊆ ARGins andRx is the binary relation
Rx ⊆ ARGins × ARGins that represents the attack between two arguments of ARGins, so that (A,B) ∈ Rx denotes that
the argument A attacks the argument B.
Since we want to improve the informational quality of explanations, we modify the general AF proposed in [4] by
adding a function that returns the form of incompatibility that exists between two instrumental arguments. Thus, an
agent will not only be able to indicate that there is an incompatibility between two goals but he will be able to indicate
the form of incompatibility.
Definition 2 (General Argumentation Framework) Let ARGins be a set of instrumental arguments that an agent can
build from K. A general AF is a tuple AFgen = 〈ARGins,Rgen, f_INCOMP〉, where Rgen = Rt ∪ Rr ∪ Rs and
f_INCOMP : Rgen → 2{t,r,s}.
Example 1 Recall the cleaner world scenario that was presented in Introduction where agent BOB has two pursuable
goals, which can be expressed as clean(5, 5) and be(fixed) in language L. Consider that there are two instrumental
arguments whose claim is clean(5, 5), namely A that has a sub-argument E whose claim is pickup(5, 5) and C that
has a sub-argument D whose claim is mop(5, 5). Besides, there are two instrumental arguments whose claim is
be(fixed), namely B that has a sub-argument H whose claim is be(in_workshop) and F that does not have any
sub-argument.
Recall also that terminal incompatibility was also exemplified. In order to exemplify the other forms of incompatibility
and generate the general AF for this scenario, consider the following situations:
• BOB has 90 units of battery. He needs 60 units for achieving C, he needs 70 units for achieving A, he
needs 30 units for achieving B, and he does not need battery for achieving F because the mechanic can
go to his position. We can notice that there is a conflict between A and B and consequently between their
sub-arguments.
• As can be noticed, there are two instrumental arguments whose claim is clean(5, 5) and two instrumental
arguments whose plan is be(fixed). It would be redundant to perform more than one plan to achieve the same
goal, this means that arguments with the same claim are conflicting due to superfluity. This conflict is also
extended to their sub-arguments.
We can now generate the general AF for the cleaner world scenario: AFgen = 〈{A,B,C,D,E,
F,H},Rgen, f_INCOMP〉 where Rt = {(A,B), (B,A), (E,B), (B,E), (E,H), (H,E), (A,H), (H,A), (C,B),
(B,C), (D,B), (B,D), (D,H), (H,D), (C,H), (H,C)}, Rr = {(A,B), (B,A), (E,B), (B,E), (A,H), (H,A),
(E,H), (H,E)}, andRs = {(C,A), (A,C), (E,D), (D,E), (C,E), (E,C), (A,D), (D,A), (F,B), (B,F ), (F,H),
(H,F )}. Figure 1 shows the graph representation.
So far, we have referred to instrumental arguments – which represent plans – however, since the selection is at goals
level, it is necessary to generate an AF where arguments represent goals. In order to generate this framework, it is
necessary to define when two goals attack each other. This definition is based on the general attack relation Rgen,
which includes the three kinds of attacks that may exist between arguments. Thus, a goal g attacks another goal g′ when
all the instrumental arguments for g (that is, the plans that allow to achieve g) have a general attack relation with all the
instrumental arguments for g′. This attack relation between goals is captured by the binary relationRG ⊆ G × G. We
denote with (g, g′) the attack relation between goals g and g′. In other words, if (g, g′) ∈ RG means that goal g attacks
goal g′.
Definition 3 (Attack between goals) Let AFgen = 〈ARGins,Rgen, f_INCOMP〉 be a general AF, g, g′ ∈ G be two
pursuable goals, ARG_INS(g)6, ARG_INS(g′) ⊆ ARGins be the set of arguments for g and g′, respectively. Goal g
attacks goal g′ when ∀A ∈ ARG_INS(g) and ∀A′ ∈ ARG_INS(g′) it holds that (A,A′) ∈ Rgen or (A′, A) ∈ Rgen.
5For further information about how instrumental arguments are built, the reader is referred to [4].
6ARG_INS(g) denotes all the instrumental arguments that represent plans that allow to achieve g.
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Figure 1: (Obtained from [8]) The general AF for the cleaner world scenario. The nodes represent the arguments
and the arrows represent the attacks between the arguments. The text next to each node indicates the claim of each
instrumental argument.
Once the attack relation between two goals was defined, it is also important to determine the forms of incompatibility that
exist between any two conflicting goals. The function INCOMP_G(g, g′) will return the set of forms of incompatibility
between goals g and g′. Thus, if (g, g′) ∈ RG, then ∀(A,A′) ∈ Rgen and ∀(A′, A) ∈ Rgen where A ∈ ARG_INS(g)
and A′ ∈ ARG_INS(g′), INCOMP_G(g, g′) = ⋃ f_INCOMP((A,A′)) ∪ f_INCOMP((A′, A)). We can now define an AF
where arguments represent goals.
Definition 4 (Goals AF) An argumentation-like framework for dealing with incompatibility between goals is a tuple
GAF = 〈G,RG, INCOMP_G, PREF〉, where: (i) G is a set of pursuable goals, (ii) RG ⊆ G × G, (iii) INCOMP_G :
RG → 2{t,r,s}, and (iv) PREF : G → (0, 1] is a function that returns the preference value of a given goal such that 1
stands for the maximum value.
Hitherto, we have considered that all attacks are symmetrical. However, as can be noticed goals have a preference value,
which indicates how valuable each goal is for the agent. Therefore, depending on this preference value, some attacks
may be considered successful. This means that the symmetry of the relation attack may be broken.
Definition 5 (Successful attack)7 Let g, g′ ∈ G be two goals, we say that g successfully attacks g′ when (g, g′) ∈ RG
and PREF(g) > PREF(g′).
Let us denote with GAFsc = 〈G,RGsc, INCOMP_G, PREF〉 the AF that results after considering the successful attacks.
The next step is to determine the set of goals that can be achieved without conflicts, which can also be called acceptable
goals and in this article, they can be explicitly called pursued goals. With this aim, it has to be applied an argumentation
semantics. Morveli-Espinoza et al. did an analysis about which semantics is more adequate for this problem. They
reached to the conclusion that the best semantics is based on conflict-free sets, on which a function is applied. Next we
present the definition given in [4] applied to the Goals AF.
Definition 6 (Semantics) Given a GAFsc = 〈G,RGsc, INCOMP_G, PREF〉. Let SCF be a set of conflict-free sets
calculated from GAFsc. MAX_UTIL : SCF → 2SCF determines the set acceptable goals. This function takes as input a
set of conflict-free sets and returns those with the maximum utility for the agent in terms of preference value.
Let G ′ ⊆ G be the set of goals returned by MAX_UTIL. This means that G ′ is the set of goals the agent can commit to,
which are called pursued goals or intentions.
Regarding the function for determining acceptable goals, there may be many ways to make the calculations; for example,
one way of characterizing MAX_UTIL is by summing up the preference value of all the goals in an extension. Another
way may be by summing up the preference value of just the main goals without considering sub-goals. We will use the
first characterization in our scenario.
7In other works (e.g., [9] [10]), it is called a defeat relation.
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Example 2 Consider the general AF of Example 1, the agent generates: GAFsc = 〈{clean(5, 5), pickup(5, 5),
mop(5, 5), be(in_workshop), be(fixed)}, {(mop(5, 5), pickup(5, 5)), (clean(5, 5), be(in_workshop)), (mop(5, 5),
be(in_workshop)), (pickup(5, 5), be(in_workshop))}, INCOMP_G, PREF〉. Figure 2 shows this GAF, the preference
values of each goal, and the form of incompatibilities that exists between pairs of goals.
clean(5,5)
mop(5,5)
be(in_workshop
PREF: 0.75
PREF: 0.8
PREF: 0.6
t
pickup(5,5)
be(fixed)
)
PREF: 0.75
PREF: 0.6
s
t,r
t,r
Figure 2: GAF for the cleaner world scenario. The text next to each arrow indicates the form of incompatibility.
From GAFsc, the number of conflict-free extensions is: |SCF | = 14. After applying MAX_UTIL, the
extension with the highest preference is: {clean(5, 5),mop(5, 5), be(fixed)}. This means that G ′ =
{clean(5, 5),mop(5, 5), be(fixed)} are compatible goals that can be achieved together without conflicts.
3 Argumentation Process for Explanations Generation
In this section, we present explanatory arguments and the process for generating explanations for a goal become pursued
or not.
First of all, let us present the types of questions that can be answered:
• WHY(g): it is required an explanation to justify why a goal g became pursued8.
• WHY_NOT(g): it is required an explanation to justify why a goal g did not become pursued.
3.1 Explanatory Arguments and Argumentation Framework
As a result of the above section, we obtain a Goals Argumentation Framework (GAF) and a set of pursued goals. Recall
that in a GAF, the arguments represent goals; hence, in order to generate an explanation from a GAF, it is necessary
to generate beliefs and rules – that reflect the knowledge contained in it – from which, explanatory arguments can
be constructed. Before presenting the beliefs and rules, let us present some functions that will be necessary for the
generation of beliefs:
• COMPS(GAFsc) = {g | @(g, g′) ∈ RGsc (or (g′, g) ∈ RGsc), where g, g′ ∈ G} . This function returns the
set of goals without conflicting relations.
• EVAL_PREF(GAFsc) = {(g, g′) | (g, g′) ∈ RGsc and (g′, g) 6∈ RGsc}. This function returns all the pairs of
goals inRG ′ that represent non-symmetrical relations between goals. When the relation is not symmetrical, it
means that one of the goals is preferred to the other.
Using these functions, the set of beliefs generated from a GAFsc = 〈G,RGsc, INCOMP_G, PREF〉 are the following:
• ∀g ∈ COMPS(GAFsc) generate a belief ¬incomp(g)
• ∀(g, g′) ∈ EVAL_PREF(GAFsc), if PREF(g) > PREF(g′), then generate pref(g, g′) and ¬pref(g′, g).
• ∀(g, g′) ∈ (RGsc \ EVAL_PREF(GAFsc)) generate a belief eq_pref(g, g′). These beliefs are created for
those pairs of goals with equal preference.
• ∀(g, g′) ∈ RGsc generate a belief incompat(g, g′, ls) where ls = INCOMP_G(g, g′)
• ∀g ∈ G ′ generate a belief max_util(g)
• ∀g ∈ G \ G ′ generate a belief ¬max_util(g)
8In order to better deal with goals, we map each goal to a constant in L.
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All the beliefs that are generated have to be added to the set of beliefs B of the agent. These beliefs are necessary for
triggering any of the following rules:
• r1 : ¬incomp(x)→ pursued(x)
• r2 : incompat(x, y, ls) ∧ pref(x, y)→ pursued(x)
• r3 : incompat(x, y, ls) ∧ ¬pref(y, x)→ ¬pursued(y)
• r4 : incompat(x, y, ls) ∧ eq_pref(x, y)→ pursued(x)
• r5 : max_util(x)→ pursued(x)
• r6 : ¬max_util(x)→ ¬pursued(x)
Let ER = {r1, r2, r3, r4, r5, r6} be the set of rules necessary for constructing explanatory arguments.
Definition 7 (Explanatory argument) Let B, ER, and g ∈ G be the set of beliefs, set of rules, and a goal of an agent,
respectively. An explanatory argument constructed from B and ER for determining the status of g is a pair A = 〈S , h〉
such that (i) S ⊆ B ∪ ER, (ii) h ∈ {pursued(g),¬pursued(g)}, (iii) S ` h, and (iv) S is consistent and minimal for
the set inclusion9.
Let ARGexp be the set of explanatory arguments that can be built from B and ER. We call S the support of an argument
A (denoted by SUPPORT(A)) and h its claim (denoted by CLAIM(A)).
We can notice that rules in ER can generate conflicting arguments because they have inconsistent conclusions. Thus,
we need to define the concept of attack. In this context, the attack that can exist between two explanatory arguments is
the well-known rebuttal [12], where two explanatory arguments support contradictory claims. Formally:
Definition 8 (Rebuttal) Let 〈S , h〉 and 〈S ′, h′〉 be two explanatory arguments. 〈S , h〉 rebuts 〈S ′, h′〉 iff h ≡ ¬h′.
Rebuttal attack has a symmetric nature, this means that two arguments rebut each other, that is, they mutually attack.
Recall that the semantics for determining the set of pursued goals is based on conflict-free sets and on a function based
on the preference value of the goals. This function is decisive in the selection of the extension that includes the goals
the agent can commit to. Thus, it is natural to believe that arguments related to such function are stronger than other
arguments. This difference in the strength of arguments turns out in a defeat relation between them, which breaks the
previously mentioned symmetry.
Definition 9 (Defeat Relation - D) Let ER be the set of rules and A = 〈S , h〉 and B = 〈S ′, h′〉 be two explanatory
arguments such that A rebuts B and vice versa. A defeats B iff r5 ∈ S (or r6 ∈ S).
We denote with (A,B) the defeat relation between A and B. In other words, if (A,B) ∈ D, it means that A defeats B.
Once we have defined arguments and the defeat relation, we can generate the AF. It is important to make it clear that a
different AF is generated for each goal.
Definition 10 (Explanatory Argumentation Framework) Let g ∈ G be a pursuable goal. An Explanatory AF for g is
a pair XAFg = 〈ARGgexp,Dg〉 where:
• ARGgexp ⊆ ARGexp such that ∀A ∈ ARGgexp, CLAIM(A) = pursued(g) or CLAIM(A) = ¬pursued(g).
• Dg ⊆ ARGgexp × ARGgexp is a binary relation that captures the defeat relation between arguments in ARGgexp.
The next step is to evaluate the arguments that make part of the AF. This evaluation is important because it determines
the set of non-conflicting arguments, which in turn determines if a goal becomes pursued or not. Recall that for
obtaining such set, an argumentation semantics has to be applied. Unlike the semantics for goals selection, in this case
we can use any of the semantics defined in literature. Next, the main semantics introduced by Dung [13] are recalled10.
Definition 11 (Semantics) Let XAFg = 〈ARGgexp,Dg〉 be an explanatory AF and E ⊆ ARGgexp:
• E is conflict-free if ∀A,B ∈ E , (A,B) /∈ Dg
9Minimal means that there is no S ′ ⊂ S such that S ` h and consistent means that it is not the case that S ` pursued(g) and
S ` ¬pursued(g) [11].
10It is not the scope of this article to study the most adequate semantics for this context or the way to select an extension when
more than one is returned by a semantics.
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• E defends A iff ∀B ∈ ARGgexp, if (B,A) ∈ Dg , then ∃C ∈ E s.t. (C,B) ∈ Dg .
• E is admissible iff it is conflict-free and defends all its elements.
• A conflict-free E is a complete extension iff we have E = {A|E defends A}.
• E is a preferred extension iff it is a maximal (w.r.t. the set inclusion) complete extension.
• E is a grounded extension iff is a minimal (w.r.t. set inclusion) complete extension.
• E is a stable extension iff E is conflict-free and ∀A ∈ ARGgexp, ∃B ∈ E such that (B,A) ∈ Dg .
Finally, a goal g becomes pursued when ∃A ∈ E such that CLAIM(A) = pursued(g).
3.2 Explanation Generation Process
In this article, an explanation is made up of a set of explanatory arguments that justify the fact that a pursuable goal
becomes (or not) pursued. Recall that there is a different explanatory AF for each pursuable goal. Thus, we can say that
an explanation for a given goal g is given by the explanatory AF generated for it, that is XAFg. Besides, if g ∈ G ′,
the explanation is required by using WHY(g); otherwise, the explanation is required by using WHY_NOT(g). Finally, we
can differentiate between partial and complete explanations depending on the set of explanatory arguments that are
employed for the justification:
• A complete explanation for g is: CEg = XAFg
• A partial explanation for g is: PEg = E , where E is an extension obtained by applying a semantics to XAFg .
We can now present the steps for generating explanations. Given a GAFsc = 〈G,RGsc, INCOMP_G, PREF〉 and a set of
pursued goals G ′, the steps for generating an explanation for a goal g ∈ G are:
1. From GAFsc generate the respective beliefs and add to B
2. Trigger the rules in ER that can be unified with the beliefs of B
3. Construct explanatory arguments based on the rules and beliefs of the two previous items
4. ∀g ∈ G do
(a) Generate the respective explanatory AF (that is, XAFg) with the arguments whose claim is pursued(g)
or ¬pursued(g) and the defeat relation
(b) Calculate the extension E from XAFg
3.3 From Explanatory Arguments to Explanatory Sentences
Like it was done in [14], in this sub-section we present a pseudo-natural language for improving the understanding of
the explanations when the agents are interacting with human users. Thus, we propose a set of explanatory schemes, one
for each rule in ER. This means that depending on which rule an argument was constructed, the explanation scheme is
different. In this first version of the scheme, we will generate explanatory sentences only for partial explanations.
Recall that goals are mapped to constants of L, in order to improve the natural language let NAME(g) denote the original
predicate of a given goal g. Besides, let RULE(A) denote which of the rules in ER was employed in order to construct
A.
Definition 12 (Explanatory Schemes) Let A = 〈S , h〉 be an explanatory argument. An explanatory scheme exp_sch
for A is:11
• If RULE(A) = r1 : ¬incomp(x)→ pursued(x), then
exp_sch = 〈NAME(x) has no incompatibility, so it became pursued.〉
• If RULE(A) = r2 : incompat(x, y, ls) ∧ pref(x, y)→ pursued(x), then
exp_sch = 〈NAME(x) and NAME(y) have the following conflicts: ls. Since NAME(x) is more preferable than
NAME(y), NAME(x) became pursued.〉
11Underlined characters represent the variables of the schemes, which depend on the variables of rules.
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• If RULE(A) = r3 : incompat(x, y, ls) ∧ ¬pref(y, x)→ ¬pursued(y), then
exp_sch = 〈NAME(x) and NAME(y) have the following conflicts: ls. Since NAME(y) is less preferable than
NAME(x), NAME(y) did not become pursued.〉
• If RULE(A) = r4 : incompat(x, y, ls) ∧ eq_pref(x, y)→ pursued(x), then
exp_sch = 〈NAME(x) and NAME(y) have the following conflicts: ls. Since NAME(x) and NAME(y) have the
same preference value, NAME(x) became pursued.〉
• If RULE(A) = r5 : max_util(x)→ pursued(x), then
exp_sch = 〈Since NAME(x) belonged to the set of goals that maximize the utility, it became pursued.〉
• If RULE(A) = r6 : ¬max_util(x)→ ¬pursued(x), then
exp_sch = 〈Since NAME(x) did not belong to the set of goals that maximizes the utility, it did not become
pursued.〉
4 Application: Cleaner World Scenario
Let us consider the GAFsc = 〈G,RGsc, INCOMP_G, PREF〉 presented in Example 2, whose graph is depicted in Figure
2. Recall also that G ′ = {clean(5, 5),mop(5, 5), be(fixed)}.
Firstly, we map the goals in G into constants of L in the following manner: g1 = clean(5, 5), g2 = pickup(5, 5),
g3 = mop(5, 5), g4 = be(in_workshop), and g5 = be(fixed). We will also map the beliefs and rules to constants in
L.
We can now follow the steps to generate the explanations:
1. Generate beliefs
- b1 : ¬incomp(g5) b10 : ¬max_util(g4)
- b2 : incompat(g3, g2, ‘s’) b11 : pref(g3, g4)
- b3 : incompat(g3, g4, ‘t’) b12 : ¬pref(g4, g3)
- b4 : incompat(g1, g4, ‘t, r’) b13 : pref(g1, g4)
- b5 : incompat(g2, g4, ‘t, r’) b14 : ¬pref(g4, g1)
- b6 : max_util(g1) b15 : pref(g2, g4)
- b7 : max_util(g3) b16 : ¬pref(g4, g2)
- b8 : max_util(g5) b17 : pref(g3, g2)
- b9 : ¬max_util(g2) b18 : ¬pref(g2, g3)
2. Trigger rules
- r1 : ¬incomp(g5)→ pursued(g5)
- r2 : incompat(g3, g2, ‘s’) ∧ pref(g3, g2)→ pursued(g3)
- r3 : incompat(g3, g2, ‘s’) ∧ ¬pref(g2, g3)→ ¬pursued(g2)
- r4 : incompat(g3, g4, ‘t’) ∧ pref(g3, g4)→ pursued(g3)
- r5 : incompat(g3, g4, ‘t’) ∧ ¬pref(g4, g3)→ ¬pursued(g4)
- r6 : incompat(g1, g4, ‘t, r’) ∧ pref(g1, g4)→ pursued(g1)
- r7 : incompat(g1, g4, ‘t, r’) ∧ ¬pref(g4, g1)→ ¬pursued(g4)
- r8 : incompat(g2, g4, ‘t, r’) ∧ pref(g2, g4)→ pursued(g2)
- r9 : incompat(g2, g4, ‘t, r’) ∧ ¬pref(g4, g2)→ ¬pursued(g4)
- r10 : max_util(g1)→ pursued(g1)
- r11 : max_util(g3)→ pursued(g3)
- r12 : max_util(g5)→ pursued(g5)
- r13 : ¬max_util(g2)→ ¬pursued(g2)
- r14 : ¬max_util(g4)→ ¬pursued(g4)
3. Construct explanatory arguments
- A1 = 〈{b1, r1}, pursued(g5)}〉 - A2 = 〈{b2, b17, r2}, pursued(g3)}〉
- A3 = 〈{b2, b18, r3},¬pursued(g2)}〉 - A4 = 〈{b3, b11, r4}, pursued(g3)}〉
- A5 = 〈{b3, b12, r5},¬pursued(g4)}〉 - A6 = 〈{b4, b13, r6}, pursued(g1)}〉
- A7 = 〈{b4, b14, r7},¬pursued(g4)}〉 - A8 = 〈{b5, b15, r8}, pursued(g2)}〉
- A9 = 〈{b5, b16, r9},¬pursued(g4)}〉 - A10 = 〈{b6, r10}, pursued(g1)}〉
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- A11 = 〈{b7, r11}, pursued(g3)} 〉 - A12 = 〈{b8, r12}, pursued(g5)}〉
- A13 = 〈{b9, r13},¬pursued(g2)}〉 - A14 = 〈{b10, r14},¬pursued(g4)}〉
4. For each goal, generate an explanatory AF and extension
- For g1: XAFg1 = 〈{A6, A10}, {}〉, E = {A6, A10}
- For g2: XAFg2 = 〈{A3, A8, A13}, {(A3, A8), (A13, A8)}〉, E = {A3, A13}
- For g3: XAFg3 = 〈{A2, A4, A11}, {}〉, E = {A2, A4, A11}
- For g4: XAFg4 = 〈{A5, A7, A9, A14}, {}〉, E = {A5, A7, A9, A14}
- For g5: XAFg5 = 〈{A1, A12}, {}〉, E = {A1, A12}
Thus, the – partial or complete – explanations for justifying the status of each goal were generated. Next, we present the
query, set of arguments of the partial explanation, and the explanatory sentences for the status of each goal:
• For the query WHY(g1), we have PE = {A6, A10}, which can be written:
* clean(5, 5) and be(in_workshop) have the following conflicts: ‘t, r’. Since clean(5, 5) is more preferable
than be(in_workshop), clean(5, 5) became pursued
* Since clean(5, 5) belonged to the set of goals that maximizes the utility, it became pursued
• For the query WHY_NOT(g2), we have PE = {A3, A13}, which can be written:
* mop(5, 5) and pickup(5, 5) have the following conflicts: ‘s’. Since pickup(5, 5) is less preferable than
mop(5, 5), pickup(5, 5) did not become pursued
* Since pickup(5, 5) did not belong to the set of goals that maximizes the utility, it did not become pursued
• For the query WHY(g3), we have PE = {A2, A4, A11}, which can be written:
* mop(5, 5) and pickup(5, 5) have the following conflicts: ‘s’. Since mop(5, 5) is more preferable than
pickup(5, 5), mop(5, 5) became pursued
* mop(5, 5) and be(in_workshop) have the following conflicts: ‘t’. Since mop(5, 5) is more preferable than
be(in_workshop), mop(5, 5) became pursued
* Since mop(5, 5) belonged to the set of goals that maximizes the utility, it became pursued
• For the query WHY_NOT(g4), we have PE = {A5, A7, A9, A14}, which can be written:
*mop(5, 5) and be(in_workshop) have the following conflicts: ‘t’. Since be(in_workshop) is less preferable
than mop(5, 5), be(in_workshop) did not become pursued
* clean(5, 5) and be(in_workshop) have the following conflicts: ‘t, r’. Since be(in_workshop) is less
preferable than clean(5, 5), be(in_workshop) did not become pursued
* pickup(5, 5) and be(in_workshop) have the following conflicts: ‘t, r’. Since be(in_workshop) is less
preferable than pickup(5, 5), be(in_workshop) did not become pursued
* Since be(in_workshop) did not belong to the set of goals that maximizes the utility, it did not become
pursued
• For the query WHY(g5), we have PE = {A1, A12}, which can be written:
* be_fixed has no incompatibility, so it became pursued
* Since be_fixed belonged to the set of goals that maximizes the utility, it became pursued
For all the queries, except WHY_NOT(g2), the complete explanation is the same. In the case of WHY_NOT(g2), the
complete explanation includes the attack relations between some of the arguments of its explanatory AF.
We are also working in a simulator – called ArgAgent12 – for generating explanations. In it first version, just partial
explanations are generated. Figure 3 shows the explanation for query WHY(g1).
5 Related Work
Since XAI is a recently emerged domain in Artificial Intelligence, there are few reviews about the works in this area.
In [15], Anjomshoae et al. make a Systematic Literature Review about goal-driven XAI, i.e., explainable agency for
robots and agents. Their results show that 22% of the platforms and architectures have not explicitly indicate their
12Available at: https://github.com/henriquermonteiro/BBGP-Agent-Simulator/
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Figure 3: Partial explanation for query WHY(g1). Obtained by using the simulator ArgAgent.
method for generating explanations, 18% of papers relied on ad-hoc methods, 9% implemented their explanations in
BDI architecture.
Some works relied on the BDI model are the following. In [16] and [17], Broekens et al. and Harbers et al.,
respectively, focus on generating explanations for humans about how their goals were achieved. Unlike our proposal,
their explanations do not focus on the goals selection. Langley et al. [18] focus on settings in which an agent receives
instructions, performs them, and then describes and explains its decisions and actions afterwards.
Sassoon et al. [19] propose an approach of explainable argumentation based on argumentation schemes and
argumentation-based dialogues. In this approach, an agent provides explanations to patients (human users) about
their treatments. In this case, argumentation is applied in a different way than in our proposal and with other focus,
they generate explanations for information seeking and persuasion. Finally, Morveli-Espinoza et al. [20] propose an
argumentation-based approach for generating explanations about the intention formation process, that is, since a goal is
a desire until it becomes an intention; however, the generated explanations about goals selection are not detailed and
they do not present a pseudo-natural language.
6 Conclusions and Future Work
In this article, we presented an argumentation-based approach for generating explanations about the goals selection
process, that is, giving reasons to justify the transition of a set of goals from being pursuable (desires) to pursued
(intentions). Such reasons are related to the conflicts that may exist between pursuable goals and how that conflicts were
resolved. In the first part of the approach, argumentation was employed to deal with conflicts and in the second part it
was employed to generate explanations. In order to improve the informational quality of explanations, we extended the
results presented in [21]. Thus, explanations also include the form of incompatibility that exists between goals. Besides,
we proposed a pseudo-natural language that is a first step to generate explanations for human users. Therefore, our
proposal is able generate explanations for both intelligent agents and human-users.
As future work, we aim to further improve the informational quality of explanations by allowing information seeking
about the exact point of conflict between two instrumental arguments (or plans) and information about the force of the
arguments. The pseudo-natural language was only applied to partial explanations, we plan to extend such language in
order to support complete explanations.
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